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BOOK REVIEW 
UNGER, Roberto, Passion, An Essay on Personality,• 
New York: MacMillan, 1984, Pp. 330, $14.95 U.S. 
RICHARD F.·DEVLIN* · _,.:_t 
Passion is Roberto Unger's methodological, epistemological and 
ontological prolegom'enon to a reconstructionist social, political and 
legal theory. 'I_'he essay builds upon his earlier critique ofLibernlism 1 
by providing the foundations for a theory oriented towards the cre­
ation of a society where the "conditions of self assertion" can thrive. 
Glimpses of this emancipatory and constructive theory have already 
emerged in his Critical Legal Studies article2 and, us for as we rnn 
tell, it is to be further adumbrated in his forthcoming Politics .:1 
Passion is a cogently structured, compel Jingly argued and seduc­
tively enthralling masterpiece which, in years to come, will undoubt­
edly stand out as an inspirational source for many who seek social 
transformation. Unger's style, in this essay at least, is lucid ancJ 
inviting. Substantively, Passion demonstrates not only the depth of 
his penetrating intellect but also his command of an array of' disci­
plines. Unger's polymathy is all the more impressive when we remem­
ber that ours is an era in which idiosyncratic specialization is the 
norm. 
The treatise is divided into three distinct sections: a methodologi­
cal introduction; a prescriptive theory of human identity based on 
*LL.B. Queen's University, Belfast; LL.M. Queen's University, Kingston. 
1 Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 19751. Law in Modem Society !New 
York: Free Press, 1976). 
2 "The Critical Legal Studies Movement"< 19831, 96 Harv a rd Law Review 561. 
3 At least one caveat is apposite. Professor Unger nppea,rs to be repenting his 
technique of producing two closely interconnected works, one essentially philosoph­
ical, the other more concrete and "practical". Each is a reinforcement of the other. 
There is therefore a danger of too hastily reviewing the present contribution and 
thereby failing to do Professor Unger justice. However, I believe this book to be of 
such radically inspirational importance that no time should be wasted in opening 
up the debate so that the foundations can be laid for the, perhaps more important, 
companion volume which promises us "a comprehensive theory of society and social 
transformation". 
� 
220 QUEEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11 the passions; and an appendix which advocates the practical appli­cation of his theory in the field of psychiatry. Unger's aim is to reconceive and reactivate the "ancient and universal practice of imputing normative force to images of man" (vii), by advocating a modernist reconstruction of the Christian-Romantic tradition via the technique of a speculative treatise on human nature. Unger presents us with a sophisticated, four stage methodological introduction in which he rejects a plethora of, what he perceives to be, stagnant traditions. His primary opponent is Positivism, "that distinction between normative and factual claims that constitutes the starting point of most modern moral and political philosophy" ( 40 l. He argues that the dichotomy of "is" and "ought", fact and value, is based upon the natural sciences and that, although this may be appropriate for them, it is (!unacceptable'' and "irrelevant" to other philosophical inquiries. Three arguments are offered in support of his position: firstly, that the results of positivistic approaches have been consistently disappointing, vacuous and contradictory; secondly, that they covertly invoke a substantive image of human nature - ·one that supports their own vis1on of "the good"; and thirdly, that the dichotomy has proved to be ultimately conservative in the attempt to improve the condition of man and society. This critique raises at least one fundamental problem. Although this reviewer would agree with Unger that Positivism is inappropri­ate to all forms of philosophy, it would also appear that he has failed to make his argument strongly enough. This second criticism is pertinent; however, the first and third criticisms are only valid if we are prepared to accept Unger's (or some other radical's) assumptions and interpretations as being correct. Consequently, if we are ulti­mately unconvinced by Unger's own argument in Passion then, at best, he has only left us with the Weberian dilemma of gods and demons and not a compelling refutation of Positivism.4 Furthermore, the critique of Positivism brings to light a problem­atic that runs throughout the essay - what might be called U'nger's 'footnoteless; style. He neither uses the word "positivism", nor does he explicitly refer to any positivist theorists. Rather, in a few pages, with a broad sweep of the pen, he delineates a tradition and offers an incisive critique. More generally, on a careful reading, one can sense debates with, and criticisms of Kuhn, Sartre, Beckett, T.S. Elliot, Nietzsche, Heidigger, Gadamer, Rawls and others. This is worn-
· 4 For a stronger critique of Positivism see Jurgen Habermas, ''The Analytical Theory 
of Science and Dialectics" and "A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism" in T.W. 
Adorno et al. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. (London: Heinemann, 
1976l and Knowledge and Human Interests <Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). 
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some since it leaves the reader unsure of who or what she might 
have missed. Furthermore, the approach may give Unger an unfair 
advantage in that his argument becomes all the more convincing 
only because of the relative ignorance of the reader. On the other 
hand, this technique demonstrates Unger's capacity to synthesize 
and portray the quintessential features of a tradition. It also has the 
advantage of inviting the reader to take Unger at his word and to 
enter into a personal discourse with him. To be fully conscious of all 
the debates may r_esult in the reader pigeon-holing the other theo­
rists and thereby bringing even more of her own prejudices into 
play. On balance, although it makes the reader uncomfortable, the 
technique renders a not insubstantial contribution to the power of 
Unger's argument. 
Having disposed of Positivism, Unger can proceed to the second 
stage of his argument- that-a different approach must be adopted. 
Rather than rejecting a normative position in toto, as Positivism 
demanded, we should instead attempt to alter the standard (Arist.olk:in 
metaphysical) version from within by submitting it to a thorough­
going criticism and revision. This allows Unger Lo outline and criti­
cise internally several traditional views of human nature und Lhen!hy 
lay the foundations for his own thesis: the integrntion of' thvnod- _ 
�rn i st ��pt of "con t�-�ll!�.U�!J1".:•.Yith .tb-� .. Chxi?ti�!lJtq!]},,� IJJ!S.,::'.L �-� .. 
of_ f0 .. �D.d!E� em.P..h .. �j� 09 .'�!lj,�rity�;_-� 
... According to Unger, two central themes pervade the Christian-
Romantic tradition's approach to personality: the firsl is the pri­
macy of personal encounter with love as its redemptive moment; the 
second is an iconoclastic attitude towards any particular social order. 
Love and iconoclasm are inextricably linked - the world must be 
changed, contexts and hierarchies must be broken, so that man's 
condition may be more fully open to love. 5 
The key then of modernism is its rejection of naturalistic, absolut­
ist contexts and its awareness of"contextualism"." On Unger's inter­
pretation modernism argues that: 
5 It is important lo notice that Unger believes that this tradition is not bound lo its 
Christian roots; for him il is as secular as it is religious and thnt to accept il, we do 
not have to be Christians or even theists. 
6 Contextual ism is the belief that all activity is ordinarily shnpcd by instilulional or 
imaginative assumptions; that contexts are contingent in that they can be sur­
passed; and, that conditionality itself can never be overcome. 
It should also be pointed out that although Unger rejects naturalism, he is also 
cautious lo distance himself from the behavioural ism of B.F. Skinner or the some­
times Marxist view of man as the concatenation of determinative social and 
economic forces. 
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.. . the personality makes and discovers itself through its experience of not fitting 
into the given settings of its existence and through its failure even to escape 
entirely from cognitive and emotional isolation.7 Significantly, it also maintains that every social system represents "an unnecessary and unjustifiable constraint on the possibilities of social life and individual existence".8 Modernism's triumph is it� realization of "plasticity", its sceptical attitude towards received conceptions of personality and society, and its pursuit of uceaseless social recombination".9 Unger argues that the modernist contextualist view of personal­ity must be seen as 11a moment in the transformation of the Christian­Romantic interpretation of human nature"; 10 that the former is continuous with and complementary to, the latter. Firstly, in both the Christian-Romantic doctrine of personal encounter and the mod­ernist emphasis on self-assertion, primacy is given to intersubjectiv­ity rather than the search for impersonal (materialist) reality or good. Secondly, both traditions emphasize context transcending since no institutional order or imaginative vision can ever fully exhaust the types of practical or passionate human connections. In brief, they are both open traditions. It is the fusion of these traditions withJ' their advocacy of solidarity, self-assertion, contextualism and open­ness that Unger wishes to. develop in his substantive theory of the passions. In the final stage of his introduction he makes more explicit the normative status of his argument. Having rejected both transcen­dentalism and Positivism, he portrays his approach as an "existen­tial project", that is, as a theory of the person that gives a measure of sense, unity and value to our lives with the consequent belief (hope?) that we can change our situation in the course of trying to under­stand it. The normative value derives not only from a sort of consciousness-raising, in the course of which we obtain wisdom as to how we should change ourselves and our societies, but also from its capacity to reactivate a belief in the potency of purposive human action. This argument is designed to avoid, among others, the mod­ernist propensity for relativism, e�treme scepticism and nihilistic fatalism which Unger perceives to be conservative. 
l The essay itself is perhaps best read as an inquiry into the nature of solidarity, its impact upon the person and her intersubjective 
7 P. 147. 
8 P. 35. 
9 P. 15. 
10 P. 38. 
1986) Book Reviews 223 
passionate relations, �:t'nd the normative consequences of these for/ 
society. 
Unger commences his tractate through an investigation of the 
essence of human nature. He argues that the quintessence of the 
person is her capacity for self-reflection (consciousness), which has 
two aspects - the "self-centered" and the "self-objectifying". For 
Unger this schizophrenic awareness is the core of the problem of 
solidarity and the dynamic for the life of passions. He then goes on 
to develop a three tier "biographical genealogy of the passions" 1 1  
which suggests how these two facets might come to co-exist. 
Through his fascinating discussion of these stages of self-formation 
we become aware of the intersubjective aspect of the problem of 
solidarity. The self as a child needs others not only for physical 
support but also for affirmation of her identity via "empatheti c  
responses". 1 2  However, since. the other is an "other", then that 
affirmation must be incomplete, and thus the self gradually becom es 
aware of her own l imitations and the reality of insa tiabil ity. This 
tension is exacerbated by a growing awareness of contingency and 
evanescence (death). These propositions allow Unger to ou tline one 
of his central theses: the dialectic of mutual longing and mutual 
jeopardy, unli mited mutual need and unlimited mutual fear ,  a crav­
ing for self-disclosure and self-surrender, infinite- seduction and infi ­
nite terror, love and hate. Unger argues that people need a rndical 
acceptance of themselves by others but that this quest is  te rr i fying 
because people m ust take risks, become vulnerabl e, expose them­
selves and suffer failure, rejection and hurt. This is t h e  pro blem of  
solidarity. There can never by complete reconci liation between mutual 
longing and m utual fear, 
. . .  between the need to susta in  and develop a self through i n \'Ol\'eml•nl i n  shared 
forms of l i fe, and the need to avoid the dependence and depersona l i z. i t i on w i th 
wh ich a l l  such involvements Lhrealen us. i :i 
Professor Unger claims that it is only from this perspective that we 
can understand the passions. 1 4  For him, passions operate in the realm 
1 1  P.  1 47 .  
1 2  P .  1 52 .  
1 3  P.  1 35 .  A l though I find  this argument both st imulat i ng and i n t u i l i \'e ly a ppeal ing 
i t  is also problematic. Unger claims that the stages of sclf-formal ion a re both 
analytic and empiri ca l ,  but it  seems to me thal their epistemological status i s  
unclear. H e  clearly intends them t.o b e  more than a neur.islic dev ice but I am 
unconvinced as  t o  their empirical val id ity .  I wonder, for example, about their 
relation to Kohlberg's psychological model of ego development. Again,  perhaps i f  
Unger had cross-referenced I would have been more convinced. 
14 Indeed, he explicitly rejects the two traditional and dominant views of passion: 
passion as opposed to reason and passion in contrast to social convention. 
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of intersubjectivity; they are a n  attempt to come to terms with the 
problem of m utual jeopardy; they are rooted in 
our most basic strivings: to be someone an o ave a place in the 
world; they are non-instrumenta l  and non-strategic; they are the 
quest for freedom, the attainment of  the conditions of self-assertion. 
In accordance with his  optim istic normative stance, Unger docs 
not stop at this essential ly descriptive point. On the contrary, despite 
his poignant awareness of the poss ib i l ity of a fai led and schizophre­
nic l i fe osci l l ating between d iversion and boredom, a hardened and 
yet submissive self, he constantly urges upon us h is  own idea l ,  "the 
romance o(.Jno.raL.s_uccess'. 1 5  Battl ing aga inst n ih i l isti c despair 
anctforvently p leading for the potential  of purposive human activ­
i ty, he beseeches us to bel ieve that freedom can only be attained 
through "renunciation and loss, risk and endurance, renewal and 
reconci l iation". 1 6  
The third stage of  Unger's substantive argument i s  an  impressive, 
indeed seductive, analysis of the passions, both the virtues and the 
vices. He begins by i ntroducing the "proto-socia l  passions"1 7  -
l ust and despai r - and demonstrates how they are i ntegra l ly related 
to the problem of sol idarity .  But the original ity and appeal  of his 
argument l i es not in his portraya l  of their destructiveness, but in 
his bel ief that inherent i n  both lust and despair is an emanci patory, 
constructive and radica l izing capacity. He proceeds to argue that 
hatred, vanity ,  pride, jea l ously and envy are al so outgrowths of the 
dynamic of mutual longing and mutual  jeopardy. Yet none of these 
are pure and, l ike the proto-social  passions, within each there is a 
capacity for turnaround since they a l l  require intersubjective aware­
ness. For Unger, inherent in each of the vices there is an internal 
tens ion through which l ove and reconci l i ation cou ld flourish. It is 
important to notice that Unger only c la ims that there is a potential ,  
not a determ inative or posit ivistic law - his aim is  that by making 
us conscious of the l im i tations of the vices we can become aware of 
our own potential and gradual ly change ourselves and our world .  
In contrad istinction to the vices, he outl ines the epiphanies of 
fa ith, hope and love. His discussion of love, i n  which he assiduously 
avoids utopianism and sentimenta l ism, is remarkable in that it evokes 
with in  the reader fee l ings and desires that have been emasculated 
by the vic issitudes of personal  experience. Hope and (secular) faith 
are portrayed as extensions of love. Importantly, Unger does not 
claim that these virtues w i l l  conquer, rather that they are passions 
' 
. .  
1 5 P. l l l .  
1 6 P. l l l .  
1 7 P. 1 74 .  
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which we as human beings have, and which have a potential ''to 
resolve conflicts which seemed insoluble and break through fron­
tiers which seemed impassible". 1 8  He claims that there are lim its 
to, and anomalies within, our alienated relations where these vir­
tues already exist and could flourish if we would only let them. For 
Unger the stagnating present is fertile with the empowering future, 
but there are no guarantees that the seeds will be sown. 1 9  
The appendix is  an address Professor Unger gave to  the American 
Psychiatric Association and can be read as a practical application of  
h is  theory. 
It is this reviewer's h ope to have made manifest Unger's intri­
guing theory of the personality, and his belief in the potential of 
progress. However, if this was all that Unger had achieved, then his 
work would probably be disregarded by lawyers who would be inclined 
to see it as abstract philosophy with little practical relevance. But 
Unger cannot be disposed of so easily. 
Inextricably linked with his moral vision Unger has a political 
vision. A theory of the personality is fundamental to n ::;oci,d and 
e_oli tical_�. He argues thaf the virtues are presel1t in ever� 
society but that: 
. . .  cu l t u res and collect iv i t ies d ifTer in their hospital i ty lo lhc�l· unruly occur­
rences, in the i r  selection of areas of soc ia l  l i fe that they recogn ize ; 1s ; 1ppropria t e  lo 
the assert ion of  fa i th .  hope and love, and in the ir  w i l l i ngness to draw po l i t ical 
infl'rences from these revela tory events.'L0 
He clearly believes that modern liberal dcmocralic sociely <locs l i llle 
to encourage the virtues. Indeed, he portrays t he  "rich western wor ld" 
as "an economy of hatred", as an egotistical, prcjud icia I ,  possessive 
hierarchial and materialist society where distrust, domination a n  
dependence fester. Here the extent of altruism is super fi c ia l  senti­
mentality and "the cowardly habit of begrudging tolcrance".'l 1 More 
specifically, he demonstrates little regard for contemporary legal 
institutions. For example, he suggests that our high regard for righ ts 
is merely an outgrowth of our lack of mutual trust. He offers a 
scathing critique of"tit-for-tat contractual ism" as the basis of social 
interaction, advocating against society where continuing coll abora­
tion and attitudes are the i mportant factors and not a rigid plan of 
· rights and responsibilities. 
18 P. 221 .  
19  I have spent much less time on this central section because the grandiloquence of 
Unger's argument speaks for itself. I have therefore only set out his position i n  
skeletal form. 
20 P. 247. 
21 P. 221 .  
226 QUEEN� LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11  Unlike some of his Critical Legal Studies colleagues, however, Unger does not confine himself to the purely negative task of "trash­ing". His avowed aim is not only subversion �_'3.!:...?..l.$0 .. se.lf and soci­etal recafisirl1ction�·--conseciu-efftly;-rejectTngthe presently  revered virtues of moderation and prudence, he advocates two practical moti-vational factors which wil l enable us to transcend not only our moral selves but also our political situation - "visionary intelligence"22 and "patient and hopeful availability".23 The task of the former is to identify the anomalies and lacunae in the dominating social system and to realistical ly exploit them in favour of the virtues so that they may become the distinguishing characteristics of a society. The lat­ter is really an exhortation to be open-minded, enthusiastic and prepared to make the necessary effort. It asks us to take advantage of a contextualist world and to be master of it, not dogmatically, but openly. In essence, it is empowerment itself in the pursuit of freedom. By going beyond critique and offering these constructive sugges­tions, Unger avoids the fatalistic conservatism of nihilism and fol­lows Marx in advocating that philosophy should be praxis. He wants to prevent any aspect of the institutional and imaginative order 
,. from gaining effective immunity from challenge, conflict and revi-sion. Thi�_ rejection of "any organizational imperative of society"24 is particularly . relevanCwHli.]:fgard"- fo· ·1aw.�H1s IS not the l iberal idea that laws· should be open to challenge, reform or repudiation; rather it is that the very ideal of the Rule of Law itself should be challengeable if that would be to the advantage of humanity. In brief, Unger would reject any fetishized view of law. The sugges­tions of his Critical Legal Studies article,25 ( itself an excellent exam­ple of applied visionary intell igence) with regard to the role that law can play in the development of a more communitarian society, must be seen in this light. Unger demonstrates a. wil lingness to utilize legal institutions, if possible, but also to go beyond them, if neces­sary.26 His advocacy of a calculated, occasional, incremental and tentative emancipatory struggle is intended to be all ·the more subversive in that such techniques dissolve the line between reform and revolution. To elaborate, Unger's work can be interpreted as part of a tradi­tion which is not only broader than the Critical Legal Studies 
22 P. 255. 
23 P. 259. 
24 P. 1 4 .  
25  Supra note 2. 
26 My aim is not to portray Unger as some demonic fiery-eyed revolutionary with an 
anti-legal propensity; r�ther it is merely to make explicit the seriousness of 
Unger's challenge to western liberal democratic.society. 
1986) Book Reviews 227 movement, but also one that has a more distinguished ancestry. Scott Warren has described this tradition as "Dialectical Theory" and has traced its origins to certain works of Kant, Hegel and the early Marx.27 It has been developed by, among others, Gramsci, Lukas, and Merleau-Ponty and is currently espoused to Habermus28 and Dallmayr. Unger should  be added to this intellectual lineage because of his emphasis on humanity, his enthusiasm for openness, and his relational style of argumentation. Most dialectical thought has advocated transcendence, humanity, community, intersubjectivity, species-being etcetera, but without adding much substance to these concepts. Unger, on the other hand, by concentrating on human nature and the passions, has caught something of what it is to be a conscious, self-reflecting and emo­tional human being. He has therefore gone further than any of his predecessors or contemporaries by providing these ideals with some­thing more than a mere slogan value. This, perhaps, is his greatest contribution. Secondly, Unger unreservedly embraces openness. For him any fixed vision of the good society is anathema since the undynamic is both dominating and dogmatic. His ideal is fre�d.om ) and empowerment, the capacity to continua l ly  _rema.ke· arid improve the world: . / 
The modernist theory of I ceaseless social recombin ation I represents less a view of/ 
the means towards the achievement of ind iv idua l  and col lective self-assertion
/
' 
than a thesis about the very mean ing of sel f-assertion.w Thirdly, Unger's style of argumentation is almost perfectly dialecti­ca l ;  his emphasis is always upon interaction, inter-relations and dynamics. Thus, we have dialectics of methodological and substan­tive, fact and value, sel f-centered and self-objectifying, self and other, self and society, satiation and insatiability, the empathetic response, solidarity and contextualism, vices and virtues, longing and jeopardy, Christian-Romantic and modernist, present and future, legal and moral-political. Unger has escaped the stultifying antino-
27 The Emergence of Dialectical Theory. Ch. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984 l. 
28 Indeed, i t  may be possible to argue that Unger is consciously working paral le l  to 
Jurgen Habermas, see, for example, "the discussion focuses upon the emotional 
rather than on the practical or the cognitive aspects of /the) problem (or sol idar ity )  
. . .  and not  the tradit ion of  shared discourse" (22> . Th is is an explicit reference to 
three of Habermas' key concepts, 'so perhaps Unger is h inting at a div ision of 
labour. However, on a close reading of both theorists there are intimat ions of 
perhaps fundamental disagreement on certai n  points, most importantly, lhc nature 
of truth and justice. 
29 P. 246. 
22S QUEEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1 1  
mies o f  Liberalism and discovered the emancipatory capacity of 
(!unifying polarities".30 
Ultimately, however, this reviewer is unconvinced by Unger's 
argument. The dissatisfaction arises from a flaw in his own dialecti­
cal mode of thought. Firstly, it is doubtful i f  Unger has successfully 
distanced love and faith from their Christian roots as the religious 
connotations may simply be too strong. This, in turn, raises the 
question of his unfail ing optimism and faith in human nature. One 
fears that he may be asking too much of humanity by seeking in us 
the courage to risk vulnerabil ity and to gamble with our deepest 
secret fears. His "visionary intelligence" (which demands realism) is 
hardly sufficient to modify his unflagging confidence. In his desire 
to reverse Gramsci ,  so that there can be optimism of both the will 
and the intellect, Unger may be in danger of mistaking the human 
race for a race of philospher-kings. 
Specifically, in discussing the relationship of exemplary personal 
love and social love he claims that: 
. . .  no sharp break separates total love between man and woman from love among 
friends and ultimately from love within a broader group.3 1  r This thesis is difficult to accept. Intimacy is fundamentally different 
from friendship or solidarity. Love of another demands a continual 
battle, a promethean struggle against oneself and one's self­
\ centeredness. To demand the same level of commitment and involve-
\ ment is to place too great a demand upon the capacities of the 
\ person. Normatively, one questions whether it is  desirable for these 
\, boundaries to be breached and intimacy so expanded. 
The problem is further complicated by Unger's embracing of the 
emancipatory capacity of conflict. Conflict, it seems, often entails 
violence and violence, in this writer's experience, usually involves 
hatred, that "event in history that most tenaciously predisposes 
people to disbelieve in  the possibility of changing the conditions of 
longing and jeopardy towards risk and reconstruction".32 Unger 
is certainly correct to claim that good can come out of conflict, 
history demonstrates that, but evil emerges from the same source. 
Interests are important to people and people will fight to preserve 
and protect those interests which they perceive to be integral to the 
preservation of their own existence. Hatred and violence may be 
endemic in any serious conflict of interests. Unger's problem may be 
that he has too great a faith in the emancipatory capacity of ideas 
and the potential of positive purposive human activity. Consequently 
30 P. 1 1 6. 
3 1 P. 222. 
32 P. 1 95. 
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his sanguinity leads him to underestimate the (negative) dialectic of 
interests and ideas. 
Yet Unger is no starry-eyed utopian dreamer. He is acutely con­
scious of the limitations of his own theory: 
I I I  may have underestimated the viru lence and versat i l i ty of our ma levolence or . . .  
have exaggerated the  redemptive power of the transforming v ir tues_:i: i 
Nevertheless, and this is the source of his radically inspirational 
power, Unger remains steadfast in his refusal to succumb to the 
Scy l la of complacency or the Charybdis of despair. 
Though not yet persuaded, I am certainly impressed. 
33 P. 248. 
